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CASE NOTES
pay his debt to the bankrupt in full and to realize in return only a dividend.42
It has already been concluded that Manhattan and Superior were debtor
and creditor and although the money Manhattan setoff was not its to keep,
it would seem equally unfair and unjust to require Manhattan to sacrifice
its own business interests and receive nothing in return.,
If, then, the propriety of allowing a setoff is to be finally governed by
equitable considerations, the result obtained from balancing the equities of
the unpreferred policyholders against those of Manhattan and the preferred
policyholders would seem to be that any advantage would rest on the side of
Manhattan and the preferred policyholders. Therefore, already having ob-
tained literal compliance with the setoff provision of the Bankruptcy Act,
there appears to be no substantial reason for disallowing Manhattan's setoff.
In conclusion, although it appears that the majority undeservedly em-
phasized the accounting setoff during the regular course of business, its final
decision was a correct one. The determination of the agent and insurer's rela-
tionship is the crucial issue in this kind of case. It is well established that a
finding of a trustee-beneficiary relationship forbids an agent's setoff. On the
other hand, since there is no substantial imbalance of equities to favor the
unpreferred policyholder, a finding of a debtor-creditor relationship should
give approval to such a setoff. As indicated, the business arrangement which
allowed Manhattan to deposit the premium collection in its own general
business account and which allowed Superior to look to Manhattan alone for
payment of the premiums in full seemed to clearly warrant the majority's
finding of a debtor-creditor relationship and, therefore, Manhattan's setoff
of the unearned premiums was properly sustained.
THOMAS R. MURTACH
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Section 8(a) (3)—Em-
ployer Burden of Proof.—NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc. 1—Great
Dane Trailers, Inc. '(hereinaf ter called Great Dane) and the Boilermakers'
Union entered into a collective-bargaining agreement effective by its terms
until March 31, 1963. The agreement included a commitment by the company
to pay vacation benefits to employees who, in the preceding year, had worked
at least 1525 hours. The agreement also provided that, in the case of a "lay-
off, termination, or quitting," employees who had served more than 60 days
during the year would be entitled to pro rata shares of their vacation benefits.
This agreement was temporarily extended beyond its termination date. On
April 30, 1963, the union gave the required 15 days' notice of intention to
strike over issues still unsettled. Subsequently, on May 16, 1963, approxi-
mately 350 of the company's 400 employees commenced a strike which lasted
until December 26, 1963. During the strike the company continued to oper-
42 See In re Gravure Paper & Board Corp., 150 F. Supp. 613, 614 (D.N.J. 1957);
see also Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Nelson, 101 F,2d at 443.
1 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
	 •
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ate by use of nonstrikers, replacements, and original strikers who abandoned
the strike. On July 12, 1963, a number of strikers demanded their accrued
vacation pay from the company. The company rejected this demand on the
ground that all contractual obligations had been terminated by the strike
and that, therefore, none of the company's employees had a right to vacation
pay. Soon thereafter, however, the company announced a new unilateral
policy granting vacation pay, in the same amounts and under the same con-
ditions prescribed by the expired agreement, to all employees who had re-
ported for work on July 1, 1963.
The union filed an unfair-labor-practice complaint with the National
Labor Relations Board charging violations of Sections 8(a) (3) and (1) of
the Labor Management Relations Act 2 by the payment of vacation benefits
to nonstrikers and the non-payment to strikers. After a hearing, the trial
examiner held that the company had violated sections 8(a) (3) and (1).
The examiner recommended that Great Dane be ordered to cease and desist
from its unfair labor practice and to pay the accrued vacation benefits to
strikers. The Board reviewed the record and adopted the trial examiner's con-
clusions and remedy.3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied enforce-
ment of the Board's order on the ground that there had been no affirmative
showing by the NLRB of an unlawful motivation to discourage union mem-
bership or to interfere with the exercise of protected employee rights. 4
Granting certiorari's to address the motivation issue? the Supreme Court
reversed. HELD: Once it is proved that an employer has engaged in dis-
criminatory conduct which could have some adverse effect upon employee
rights, the burden is upon the employer to assert that it was motivated by
"legitimate and substantial business justifications. . . ."7 Since Great Dane
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1964). Section 8(a) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title [Section 7 of the Labor
Management Relations Act];
.	 . 	 . 	 .
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization;
	
Section 7 provides: 	 •
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
a Great Dane Trailers, Inc. 150 N.L.R.B. 438, 58 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1964).
4 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc. 363 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1966). Although the
company itself had not introduced evidence of a legitimate purpose for its discriminatory
action, the court of appeals speculated that it might have been motivated by a desire
"(1) to reduce expenses; (2) to encourage longer tenure among present employees; or
(3) to discourage early leaves immediately before vacation periods." Id. at 134.
5 385 U.S. 1000 (1967).
6 388 U.S. at 31.
	7  Id. at 34. 	 •
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did not come forward with any evidence, it simply failed to meet its burden
of proof.
In dissent Justices Harlan and Stewart contended that, according to the
leading cases, the employer bore the burden of proving proper motive only
in those cases where his discriminatory conduct was "inherently destructive"
of union rights. Otherwise the Board carried the burden of producing inde-
pendent evidence of antiunion motive. The dissent also argued that the
majority's language requiring the employer to prove "substantial" as well
as "legitimate" business ends implied a new and heavier burden of proof.
The Great Dane case focuses upon the necessity of an antiunion motive
for a violation of section 8(a) (3). The majority opinion would seem to re-
quire a multi-stage process governing the proof of such motive: first, the
NLRB must determine whether the objective conduct, divorced from all
motive, carries discriminatory impact upon statutorily protected union rights;
the employer must then assert the "legitimate objectives" which motivated
its conduct; next, the conduct is categorized as either inherently destructive
or slightly destructive of union rights; finally, in the case of the slightly
destructive conduct, the Board must independently prove an unlawful em-
ployer motive.
The presence of hostile employer motive is determinative of a violation
once the Board finds that the employer's conduct has discriminatory impact,
and thus that it has the effect of discouraging union membership. 8 "Discour-
aging membership" within the meaning of section 8(a) (3) includes discourag-
ing participation in concerted activities, for example, a legitimate strike .°
Thus, in Erie Resistor Corp. v. NLRB, 1° the Supreme Court found the
employer's super-seniority credit to strike replacements and returning strikers
to be so destructive of the collective-bargaining process because of its crip-
pling effect upon the strike and union solidarity, that it held the conduct
to be "inherently discriminatory." In the 1965 lockout cases, 11 NLRB v.
Brown12 and American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRBP the employer's conduct,
divorced from his motive, had a discriminatory impact upon union employees
because it affected them solely by reason of their union membership. In
8 The purpose of the hostile motive requirement is two-fold: (1) to protect
the employer's prerogative to select, discharge, lay off, transfer, promote, or
demote his employees for any reason other than those proscribed by the Act;
(2) to keep the Board's thumb off the bargaining scales in order to preserve
free collective bargaining."
Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing,
Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 Cornell L.Q. 491, 516 (1967). The hostile motive
requirement was developed by a series of leading Supreme Court decisions. E.g., NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667
(1961); Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Associated Press v. NLRB,
301 U.S. 103 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
0 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 233.
10 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
11 For a discussion of the lockout cases see Ross, Lockouts: A New Dimension in
Collective Bargaining, 7 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 847 (1966); Comment, 1965-66
Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 909, 978 (1966).
12 380 U .S . 278 (1965).
13 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
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Brown, members of a multi-employer retail-store group locked out all the
employees represented by the union which had struck one of its member
stores. In American Ship Bldg., the employer, upon reaching a bargaining
impasse with the unions representing his employees, shut down one shipyard
and drastically reduced employment at two others. In Great Dane, the Court
first established the discriminatory impact of the employer's conduct. It
found that payment of accrued benefits to one group of employees and denial
of the same benefits to another group, distinguishable only by their partici-
pation in a protected concerted activity, discourages present or future con-
certed activity, and thus discourages union membership.
Once discriminatory impact is established the issue of section 8(a)(3)
violation becomes one of employer motive. The problem raised by Great
Dane is exactly who has the burden of proving the facts which allow the
court to determine the employer's motive. The Court's treatment of this issue
in Great Dane relies upon the language of the three leading cases: Erie
Resistor, Brown, and American Ship Bldg. In order to determine the place-
ment of burdens, the Court in each of these cases distinguished two types
of employer conduct: (1) that which is inherently destructive of union
rights; and (2) that which is only slightly destructive of union rights.
In Erie Resistor, the Court considered for the first time conduct the
very nature of which implied the existence of antiunion animus." Thus spe-
cific evidence of a subjective illegal intent was not considered an indispens-
able element for proving a violation." Instead, improper motive was found
to be implicit in the inherently discriminatory or destructive nature of the
conduct itself, and the burden of proving legitimate business objectives was
placed upon the employer. As the Court explained in Erie Resistor:
The employer in such cases must be held to intend the very con-
sequences which foreseeably and inescapably flow from his ac-
tions and if he fails to explain away, to justify or to characterize
his actions as something different than they appear on their face,
an unfair labor practice charge is made out. 16
Further, in Brown and American Ship Bldg., the Court considered certain
conduct as being so "inherently destructive of employee interests" that it
may be held proscribed without further proof of any underlying antiunion
motives.'? Therefore, in terms of evidentiary burdens, where the employer's
discriminatory conduct is "inherently destructive" he must come forward
with proof of business justifications to overcome the inference of improper
motive derived from the conduct itself.
The second category of employer conduct refers to situations where
the adverse effect of the conduct on employee rights is "comparatively slight
and the employer's conduct is reasonably adapted to achieve legitimate
14 The concept of inherently destructive conduct was explicitly enunciated for the
first time in Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. at 44-45.
15 373 U.S. at 227.
10 Id. at 228. •
17 380 U.S. at 287; 380 U.S. at 311.
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business ends or to deal with business exigencies . . . ."18 Here, the burden
lies upon the Board to produce specific independent evidence of antiunion
motive. If antiunion motive is proved, an otherwise ordinary business act
is converted into an unfair labor practice.
The employer's burden in cases of slightly destructive conduct is made
explicit for the first time in Great Dane. As the Court stated, "if the adverse
effect ... on employee rights is 'comparatively slight,' an antiunion motiva-
tion must be proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward
with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the
conduct."'" Thus, the Court concluded, once it has been proved that the em-
ployer engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected
employee rights to some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish
that it was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is
most accessible to him.2°
The facts of the three leading cases illustrate the two categories of
employer conduct. In Erie Resistor the employer's super-seniority practice
was held inherently destructive of his employees' right to strike because of
its discrimination between strikers and nonstrikers, both during and after
the strike, and because of its crippling impact upon the strike and union
activity?' The Court upheld the Board's determination that the employer's
asserted business purpose—to maintain production by attracting replace-
ments and returning strikers—could not justify this inherently destructive
impact on the union's right to strike. In Brown, the employer established
that the purpose of the lockout and the continuation of business with tem-
porary replacements was the protection of the integrity of the bargaining
group against the union's whipsaw strike?" The company's conduct was
deemed not inherently destructive of union rights, and the Board failed to
is NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287-88 (1965). The authority quoted in the text
develops two prerequisites for legality when the employer's conduct falls within this
second category. First, the conduct must be slightly destructive of union rights. As the
Court in Brown stated:
When the resulting harm to employee rights is thus comparatively slight, and a
substantial and legitimate business end is served, the employer's conduct is
prima facie lawful, Under these circumstances the finding of an unfair labor
practice under § 8(a) (3) requires a showing of improper subjective intent.
380 U.S. at 289. Second, the conduct must have been undertaken for a legitimate business
end. The case development of the rule requiring a legitimate business end was first
enunciated in NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). For a dis-
cussion of the case development after Mackay see Note, 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 438
(1963).
19 388 U.S. at 34.
20 Id.
21 The Court enumerated certain extremely destructive characteristics of the com-
pany's super-seniority plan including the permanent division created within the plant
between those who stayed with the union and those who abandoned the strike to gain
super-seniority. "This breach . . . stands as an ever present reminder of the dangers
connected with striking and with union activities in general." 373 U.S. at 230-31.
22 In the classic case of a whipsaw strike the union breaks off negotiations with a
multi-employer bargaining association and attempts to force an agreement with one of
the employer members of the association by calling a strike against him. Lab. Rel. Rep.
(Expediter)"532 (1966).
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meet the burden of showing independent evidence of an antiunion motive.
Similarly, in American Skip Bldg., an employer's lockout was held not to be
inherently destructive of employee rights. After a bargaining impasse, the
employer temporarily shut down his plant and laid off his employees for the
sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his legiti-
mate bargaining position. Specifically, the employer established that it had
locked out its employees to avert especially harmful economic consequences
threatening it and its customers if a strike were called during its busy season.
The allocation of evidentiary burdens with respect to categories of
employer conduct prepares the court for the task of balancing competing
interests. The employer must show the required business justifications which
then must be balanced against either the implications of the conduct itself
or the independent evidence of unlawful intent produced by the Board. If
the employer's asserted business interests do not outweigh the harm to pro-
tected employee rights, his conduct is violative of section 8(a) (3). The Court
acknowledged this balancing process in Erie Resistor:
As is not uncommon in human experience, such situations present
a complex of motives and preferring one motive to another is in
reality the far more delicate task, reflected in part in decisions of
this Court, of weighing the interests of employees in concerted
activity against the interest of the employer in operating his busi-
ness in a particular manner and of balancing in the light of the
Act and its policy the intended consequences upon employee rights
against the business ends to be served by the employers' conduct. 23
The significance of this underlying balancing process is its necessary impli-
cation that the employer must bring to his side of the scale at least some
assertion of legitimate purpose. Such an assertion is necessary regardless of
whether the employer's conduct is inherently destructive of employee rights
or only slightly destructive.
The ratio decidendi of Great Dane purports to be a consistent application
of the formulae governing the proof of motive. The significance of Great
Dane lies in whether it does, in effect, alter the location or the content of
the burdens of proof. The Court, as Justice Harlan argued, may be raising
a new "presumption" of an unlawful motive which the employer must now
overcome before the Board has to produce independent evidence of unlawful
intent even in cases of only slightly destructive conduct 24 The issue is
whether this preliminary presumption is a new burden upon the employer
or whether it is a burden which has been implicit throughout the Erie Resistor,
Brown, and American ship Bldg. pronouncements. Certain dicta from the
previous cases, taken alone, stress the Board's burden of producing inde-
pendent evidence of improper motive when the discriminatory conduct is of
the slightly destructive variety. In Brown, for example, the Court categorized
the employer's conduct as slightly destructive in which case the "actual sub-
jective intent is determinative, and . . . the Board must find from the evi-
23 373 U.S. at 228-29.
24 388 U.S. at 38 (dissenting opinion).
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dence independent of the mere conduct involved that the conduct was
primarily motivated by an antiunion animus." 25 Similarly, dicta in American
Ship Bldg. states, "To find a violation of § 8(a) (3), then, the Board must
find that the employer acted for a proscribed purpose." 26 It is submitted
that this language is not inconsistent with the Great Dane rationale. Nothing
in the instant case relieves the Board of the burden of introducing inde-
pendent evidence of unlawful motive in cases of only slightly destructive
employer practices. On the contrary, the instant case merely requires that,
regardless of the degree of harm that the conduct involves, the employer
must assert a legitimate business purpose. The Board's burden and the
employer's burden have never been held to be mutually exclusive; both may
be operative in the same case. The teaching of Great Dane is that the em-
ployer's burden is a precedent burden in all section 8(a) (3) cases.
In addition to being consistent with the prior cases on the issue of the
Board's burden of proof, Great Dane also appears to be consistent with those
cases in its decision regarding the employer's burden of proving "legitimate
objectives" in cases where the conduct is only slightly destructive of union
rights. That such a burden was present, albeit implicit, in the previous cases
is supported by the Court's statement in Brown:
But where, as here, the tendency to discourage union membership
is comparatively slight, and the employers' conduct is reasonably
adapted to achieve legitimate business ends or to deal with business
exigencies, we enter into an area where the improper motivation of
the employers must be established by independent evidence. 27
(Emphasis added.)
It is clear from this statement that proof of "legitimate ends" or "business
exigencies" is necessary, and it may be inferred that since the employer is
the party most likely to be familiar with such matters, the burden of pre-
senting them lies with him. Seven members of the Great Dane Court appar-
ently so construed the quoted language.
It is arguable that in the previous cases the emphasis on categories of
conduct left the employer's burden inexplicit and perhaps lulled the Great
Dane Company into a mistakenly passive strategy, but the wisdom of the
company's failure to assert any positive business justifications remains ques-
tionable in view of the facts of the preceding cases. In Erie Resistor the
employer insisted that his super-seniority practices were necessary to keep
the plant open. 28 In Brown the employer successfully argued that use of the
lockout weapon was justified to protect a multi-employer bargaining unit from
disintegration threatened by a whipsaw strike. 28 In American Ship Bldg. the
employer established that it locked out to avert the especially harmful eco-
nomic consequences which would have fallen upon it and its customers if a
25 380 U.S. at 288.
26 380 U.S. at 313.
TT 380 U.S. at 287-88.
28 373 U.S. at 225.
22 See 380 U.S. at 282-90.
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strike were called later when the shipyard would be heavily occupied. 3° In
contrast, the Great Dane company's explanation for discriminatory payment
of vacation benefits was: (1) that the expired contract was no longer bind-
ing; and (2) that permanently replaced strikers were no longer of "employee"
status and thus no longer entitled to benefits. The trial examiner rejected
these explanations as any form of business justification. 31
 Similarly, the
Board's brief points to the relative insubstantiality of the company's alle-
gations in comparison to the business ends asserted in the previous cases. 32
Closely related to the question of which party shall bear the burden is
the issue of the weight of the burden. The possibility has been raised that
the Court may have increased the burden which the employer must bear and
thus may have eroded the distinction between employer conduct which is
inherently destructive and that which is slightly destructive of employee
rights.'" The source of concern is the majority's conclusion that even in in-
stances of slightly destructive practices the Board must prove an antiunion
motive only if the employer has come forward with evidence of "legitimate
and substantial business justifications for the conduct." 34 (Emphasis added.)
It is feared that the Board would be free to weigh the word "substantial"
heavily in defining "business justifications" or "legitimate objectives," and
that all business justifications or objectives held insufficiently "substantial"
would be regularly outweighed by the union interest. In this way the Board
might unduly restrict the employer's economic weapons in the collective-
bargaining process. Possibly such a "substantial burden" would actually
require the employer to prove a lack of antiunion animus on his part, instead
of leaving the affirmative burden on the Board.
The use of the word "substantial" in Great Dane, however, does not
violate the continuity of the leading cases. The language of the Court is pre-
served from Brown. The majority opinion refers to "substantial and legiti-
mate justifications" and finally to simply "legitimate objectives," both of
which are basically the same as the original "substantial and legitimate
business ends" requirement enunciated in Brown.35 Therefore, the term "sub-
stantial" is not newly introduced in Great Dane, and there is no heavier
burden upon the employer after Great Dane than there was previously.
Rather the Board will bear the burden of an affirmative showing of illegal
motive once the employer has asserted legitimate objectives. The word "sub-
stantial" has been part of the law since Brown; there should be no reason,
therefore, to fear that the Board will interpret it so that the employer will,
30 380 U.S. at 305.
31 The trial examiner concluded his assessment of the restrictions saying,
Stripped to its essentials, Respondent was in effect saying to all its employees:
"Refrain from joining the strike, or having joined it, abandon the strike and
return to work, and you will receive the vacation benefits due, but join or
continue adherence to the strike, you will not receive the vacation benefits to
which you would otherwise be entitled."
150 N.L.R.B. at 443.
82 Brief for Petitioner at 14, n.11, 388 U.S 26 (1967).
33 388 U.S. at 39 (dissenting opinion).
34 Id. at 34.
35 380 U.S. at 289.
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in effect, have to disprove an unestablished illegal purpose, rather than have
to .prove a legitimate objective.
The present case indicates that the Court will require the employer to
assert some business justifications. It does not establish a new and arduous
standard of substantiality. If substantial and legitimate ends denote some
asserted business justifications, then the employer must look to Erie Resistor,
Brown, and American Ship Bldg. for examples of such justifications. The
fact that "legitimate objectives" are part of the balance-of-interest process
should now illustrate to the employer his burden to produce some actual
counterweight for his own side of the scale. The lesson of Great Dane is that
an employer who offers no genuine countervailing interest to a section 8(a) (3)
charge of discriminatory conduct will automatically lose his case. It is now
apparently settled that the terms "business justifications" and "legitimate
objectives" require more positive interests than those alleged in Great Dane.
MITCHELL J. SIKORA
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Section 8 (b) (1) (A)-
Court-Enforced Fines Under a Union-Shop Provision.—NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. 1—Employees of Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company
represented by locals of the United Automobile Workers under a union-shop
provision2 voted to strike at two Wisconsin plants. Despite union picket
lines, several members of the union continued to work during the strike.
Upon conclusion of the dispute, the union found the strikebreaking members
guilty of "conduct unbecoming a union member" and fined them from $20
to $100.3 When several refused to pay the fine, one of the locals successfully
enforced the fines by bringing a test suit for collection in a state court against
one of the strikebreakers who, prior to the strike, had fully. participated in
union affairs. 4 Allis-Chalmers then filed unfair-labor-practice charges with
the National Labor Relations Board. The company asserted the right of the
fined members to refrain from concerted union activity under Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act; the fines, the company argued, restrained
or coerced the workers in the exercise of that right and, therefore, violated
1 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
2 The collective-bargaining agreements contain a union-security provision which
requires employees to become and "'remain members of the Union to the extent of pay-
ing dues.'" Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656, 657 (7th Cir. 1966).
3 The UAW constitution requires members to "support strike action" taken in
accordance with the constitution (Art. 2, Sec. 3) and provides for sanctions for viola-
tions including reprimand, fines not to exceed one hundred dollars, and suspension or
expulsion from the International Union (Art. 30, Sec: 10). Brief for Appellant at 4-5,
388 U.S. 175 (1967).
4 Local 248, UAW v. Natzke, No. 313-673 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee County March 3,
1964), aff'd, 4 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 12,251 (Wis. Sup. Ct. Oct. 31, 1967). In this test case
brought by the union, the court held that the defendant became a member of the union
for all purposes including attendance at union meetings, and had therefore assumed all
of the duties of membership. But see Glass Workers, Local 188 v. Seitz, 65 Wash. 2d
640, 399 P.2d 74 (1965).
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